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Third-party funding indisputably puts a gold-weighted thumb on the
scales of justice in favor of funded parties for two main reasons: (1)
funded cases already tend to be calculable winners on the merits, and
(2) third-party funders seeking a profit generally do not fund cases that
are demonstrably likely to lose on the merits. Thus, we are left with both
the promising potential for winners to be more likely to win with third-
party funding and the alarming realization that not all winners are
offered this same chance. This provokes a larger, fundamental question:
If funders are picking winners among the winners, then what does real
access to justice look like in an era of third-party funding? Would real
access to justice need to involve third-party funders funding indigent or
innocent defendants, expensive long-shot claimants, righteous
injunctions with no monetary recovery, or unprofitable cases that
espouse some worthy yet controversial position?
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This Essay uses a thought experiment to identify areas of law and
categories of parties where the promise of third-party funding may be
falling short with respect to expanding access to civil justice. After
outlining the thorny needles of this problem, this Essay presents a
potential solution for funding longshot winners, expensive winners,
defendant winners, non-financial winners, and political winners—
depending on the facts and circumstances of the disputes.
This Essay argues that if funders decide to fund only one additional
category of parties in the name of increasing “access to justice”— even
if such funding cuts against the funder’s own profit-seeking interests—
then civil defendants are as good a place as any to begin. Civil
defendants, by definition, do not commence the litigation and,
therefore, in theory, there can be no corporate influence from the third-
party funder with respect to stirring up the litigation itself (i.e.,
maintenance, champerty, and barratry). In addition, this Essay argues
that other worthy aspects of the case itself—besides financial worth—
may be the true foundation of “access to justice” that funders should
espouse and support financially. This Essay concludes with a few ideas
regarding how a funder might modify its algorithms and decision-
making processes to include some of these aspects as factors to weigh in
determining whether to fund the myriad categories of “unfunded
winners” to help rebalance the scales of justice.
INTRODUCTION
One reason for the public outcry against third-party funding1 is the
widespread perception that it is unbalancing our notions of party-
1. An in-depth working definition of “third-party funding” is provided later in this Essay. See
infra Part I.A and accompanying text. For now, third-party funding can be simply defined as a
financial arrangement between a party involved in a dispute and an outside entity through which
the party seeks funding for its legal representation instead of self-financing. For a more thorough
and nuanced description of third-party funding, see generally LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VIC-
TORIA SHANNON SAHANI, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2d ed.
2017). See also Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway - Third Party Litigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1270, 1275–77 (2011); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-
Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 161, 167 (2011);
Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 (2011); Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State
Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2002); Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal
Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 12
(2014); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 329
(1987); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV.
377, 379 (2014); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Re-Re-Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer Lend-
ing Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, Again, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
110, 112 (2013); W. Bradley Wendel, Paying the Piper But Not Calling the Tune: Litigation Fi-
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driven dispute resolution processes and even-handed tribunals.2 In the
aspirational vision of idyllic dispute resolution, an arbitrator or judge
oversees the proper administration of the proverbial “scales of jus-
tice” in an orderly manner and “balances” out party-power differen-
tials calmly through procedural evenhandedness. Yet, third-party
funding indisputably puts a gold-weighted thumb on the scale in favor
of funded parties, particularly since funded cases already tend to be
calculable winners on the merits, and since third-party funders seeking
a profit generally do not fund cases that are demonstrably likely to
lose on the merits.3
Thus, we are left with the promising potential for winners to be
more likely to win with third-party funding, and the alarming realiza-
tion that not all parties are offered this same chance to win for several
reasons. First, traditional for-profit third-party funders only fund cases
from which they can make a profit.4 Thus, many merit-based winners
whose claims are too expensive to pursue relative to their claim value
nancing and Professional Independence, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2018); W. Bradley Wendel,
Litigation Trolls, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 725 (2016); W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation
Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 656 (2014); J. Maria
Glover, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Limits of the Work-Product Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 911, 918, 922–23 (2016); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, On Regulatory Discord and
Procedure, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 819, 823 (2015); Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass
Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
306, 320–22 (2011); Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party Financing of Class Action Litigation in the
United States: Will The Sky Fall, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 500, 509–10 (2014); Victoria A. Shan-
non, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 863 n.1,
869 (2015); Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388, 390
(2016); Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, 91 TUL. L. REV. 405, 407
(2017).
2. Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Peter Thiel’s funding of Hulk Hogan-Gawker litigation should not
raise concerns, WASH. POST (May 26, 2016) (“Anyone who donates to the ACLU or a Legal Aid
fund is basically underwriting third-party litigation. Most recently, private profit-motivated liti-
gation finance has emerged as an industry in its own right, unburdened by any concern over the
old common law rules . . . . By current standards, [such] funding should raise no eyebrows —
unless one also wants to revisit public interest litigation, class actions and contingent fees . . . .
But if the lawsuit is not frivolous, it is hard to see how the motivations of funders are relevant (or
discernible). One would not say a civil rights organization could not accept donations from phi-
lanthropists angered by a personal experience with discrimination. All [this] has done is cut out
the middleman.”).
3. Cf. NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 25 (“[I]t helps to look at a third-party funder’s
motivations. At any point in time, the third-party funder will be determining on which one of
three paths the litigation sits: (1) is the third-party funder still likely to make a significant profit;
(2) if not, does the third-party funder have a decent chance of emerging with some or all of its
original investment intact (and possibly a modest profit) if it continues to fund; or (3) is it likely
that any new money invested will be wasted, alongside the old money? Only in the latter case
(path 3) is it likely that the third-party funder will want to terminate.”).
4. Cf. NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 33–34 (describing traditional commercial third-
party funding investments as seeking “three times” or “3X” return on investment, at a
minimum).
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are turned down. Second, it is likely that long-shot winners—cases too
risky even for a third-party funder—are less likely to be funded as
well. These cases include those that rightfully argue for a change in
the law or rely on creative theories that require mental and verbal
jujitsu to convince the decision-maker of their merit (i.e., the stuff of
Hollywood films about courageous lawyers and citizens fighting
against insurmountable odds). Third, defendant winners may be less
likely to be funded unless those defendants already have hefty funds
at their disposal through which to either pay the funder a periodic
premium or pay the funder from their own pockets (rather than from
the proceeds of an award) upon winning the case. Fourth, non-finan-
cial winners—parties seeking non-financial remedies—are not likely
to be funded unless they are willing to pay the funder from their own
pockets, since there will be no monetary judgment upon winning the
case. Fifth, political winners are not likely to be funded, as many
funders choose not to engage in funding of controversial positions,
parties, or of cases involving governments—which may be viewed as
courageous or cowardly, depending on the type of party or issue at
stake in the case.
The foregoing examples collectively engender a larger, fundamental
question: If funders are picking primarily winners—and more specifi-
cally winners that suit their profit-making business model—then what
does real access to justice look like in an era of third-party funding?
Would real access to justice need to involve third-party funders fund-
ing indigent or innocent defendants, or expensive long-shot claimants,
or righteous injunctions with no monetary recovery, or unprofitable
cases that espouse some worthy yet controversial position?
Much has been written about access to justice in civil litigation.5
This Essay contributes to the conversation by presenting a theoretical
framework to assess the level of access to justice that currently exists
and determine pathways to increasing access to justice. This Essay
5. See generally Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28
GA. L. REV. 633 (1994); Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in A World of Expanding Social Capa-
bility, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (2010); Marc Galanter, “Old and in the Way”: The Coming
Demographic Transformation of the Legal Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of
Legal Services, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1081 (1999); Michele Goodwin & Mariah Lindsay, American
Courts and the Sex Blind Spot: Legitimacy and Representation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2337
(2019); Sande L. Buhai, Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective,
42 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 979 (2009); Laura K. Abel, Evidence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 295 (2009); Ian Weinstein, Coordinating Access to Justice for Low- and
Moderate-Income People, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 501 (2017); Jessica K. Steinberg,
Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741 (2015); Chase T. Rogers,
Access to Justice: New Approaches to Ensure Meaningful Participation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1447
(2015).
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proposes working definitions of “third-party funding” and “access to
justice,” and then presents a thought experiment to assess which par-
ties currently have access to justice and which parties may lack such
access. This Essay concludes by suggesting some next steps regarding
how to increase access to justice in civil proceedings.
I. ASSUMPTIONS MADE
A. Defining “Third-Party Funding”
What is third-party funding? Put simply, third-party funding is an
arrangement in which a party involved in a dispute seeks funding from
an outside entity for its legal representation instead of financing its
own legal representation.6 The outside entity—called a “third-party
funder”—finances the party’s legal representation in return for a
profit.7 The third-party funder could be a bank, hedge fund, insurance
company, or some other entity or individual.8 If the funded party is
the plaintiff, then the funder typically contracts to receive a percent-
age or fraction of the monetary award from the case if the plaintiff
wins.9 Unlike a loan, the funded plaintiff does not have to repay the
funder if it loses the case or does not recover any money.10 If the
funded party is the defendant, then the funder contracts to receive a
predetermined payment from the defendant—similar to an insurance
premium—and the agreement may include an extra payment to the
funder if the defendant wins the case.11 In addition to these traditional
third-party funding structures, there are many other innovative third-
party funding transaction structures that may be used, the analysis of
which are not the focus of this Essay.12
To cast the widest net, this Essay adopts the ICCA-Queen Mary
Task Force on Third-Party Funding13 definition of “third-party fund-
ing,” which reads as follows:
6. A party may also engage both a contingency fee attorney and a third-party litigation funder
to work together simultaneously on its case.
7. NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 1.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 4–5.
10. Id. at 4–6.
11. Id. at 3–5.
12. See generally Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, supra note 1 (discussing innovative
third-party funding transaction structures including funder-client and funder-law firm
partnerships).
13. This Task Force on Third-Party Funding was organized as a collaboration between the
International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) and Queen Mary University of
London School of Law between 2013 and 2018. See ICCA, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING, https://
www.arbitration-icca.org/projects/Third_Party_Funding.html.
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The term “third-party funding” refers to an agreement by an en-
tity that is not a party to the dispute to provide a party, an affiliate
of that party or a law firm representing that party,
(a) funds or other material support in order to finance part or all
of the cost of the proceedings, either individually or as part of a
specific range of cases, and
(b) such support or financing is either provided in exchange for
remuneration or reimbursement that is wholly or partially depen-
dent on the outcome of the dispute, or provided through a grant
[i.e., pro bono] or in return for a premium payment.14
This definition encompasses traditional for-profit third-party funding
investments as well as not-for-profit third-party funding, in which
profit-making is not the primary motive.15
Third-party funding is widespread around the world in both litiga-
tion and arbitration. A large and growing number of banks, hedge
funds, and other financial institutions are funding the legal representa-
tion of parties to litigation as a type of investment. This phenomenon
is growing exponentially and is already estimated to be a multibillion-
dollar industry both domestically and internationally.16 In addition,
depending on the structure of the funding arrangement, the funder
may legally control or influence aspects of the legal representation or
may completely take over the case and step into the shoes of the origi-
nal party.17 The United States is home to dozens of funders of con-
sumer disputes, like personal injury and other tort claims, and funders
14. ICCA, ICCA QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE REPORT ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN LITIGA-
TION, ICCA REP. NO. 4 (Apr. 2018), www.litigation-icca.org/publications/Third-Party-
FundingReport.html.
15. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Revealing Not-for-Profit Third-Party Funders in Investment
Arbitration, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS: INV. CLAIMS (Mar. 1, 2017), http://oxia.ouplaw.com/page/
third-party-funders.
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Smith, Litigation Investors Gain Ground in U.S., WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/Essays/SB10001424052702303819704579316621131535960
[hereinafter Smith, Litigation Investors Gain Ground in U.S.] (several funders have several hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in assets under management); Jennifer Smith, Investors Put Up Mil-
lions of Dollars to Fund Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/Essays/
SB10001424127887323820304578408794155816934 [hereinafter Smith, Investors Put Up Millions
of Dollars to Fund Lawsuits] (“Gerchen Keller Capital LLC, a Chicago-based team that includes
former lawyers . . . has raised more than $100 million and says there is plenty of room for
newcomers given the size of the U.S. litigation market, which they put at more than $200 billion,
measuring the money spent by plaintiffs and defendants on litigation.”); Vanessa O’Connell,
Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2011) (“The new breed
of profit-seeker sees a huge, untapped market for betting on high-stakes commercial claims.
After all, companies will spend about $15.5 billion this year on U.S. commercial litigation and an
additional $2.6 billion on intellectual-property litigation, according to estimates by BTI Consult-
ing Group Inc.”).
17. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 6–7 (explaining that some third-party funding
arrangements are structured as an assignment in which the third-party funder becomes the
claimant in the case and the original party is no longer involved). For an in-depth treatment of
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of large, complex corporate disputes.18 In light of its increasing preva-
lence, there is a fascinating debate regarding the place of third-party
funding both in the American legal system and in the context of inter-
national dispute resolution.19
There are four main drivers of the third-party funding industry
worldwide. First, funders help some—but not all —individual plain-
tiffs bring claims that they would not otherwise be able to bring, which
supports the public policy ideal of increasing access to justice for indi-
gent or disadvantaged persons.20 It is important to note that third-
party funding’s contribution to increasing access to justice for plain-
tiffs does not reinforce the rights of civil defendants to present an ade-
quate defense, which will be addressed later in this Essay. Second,
many insolvent companies and small companies are seeking means to
pursue valid claims that they could not otherwise afford to pursue and
that are too risky for a contingency fee attorney to accept.21 Third,
assignment and insurance policies in the third-party funding context, see generally Sebok, supra
note 1; Bond, supra note 1; Cain, supra note 1; Shukaitis, supra note 1.
18. Regarding consumer disputes, there are over thirty third-party funding companies funding
consumer claims as members of the American Legal Finance Association (ALFA), as well as
several other third-party funding companies that are not members of ALFA funding consumer
disputes. ALFA, http://www.americanlegalfin.com/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). Regarding com-
mercial disputes, see Smith, Litigation Investors Gain Ground in U.S., supra note 16; Smith,
Investors Put Up Millions of Dollars to Fund Lawsuits, supra note 16; O’Connell, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 504, 508, 513–23,
523 n.113, 526–27 (2006); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West
of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 56–57, 68–69,
72, 74, 77 (2004) [hereinafter Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry]; Susan Lorde Martin,
Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53
VILL. L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2008) [hereinafter Martin, Litigation Financing]; Anthony J. Sebok,
The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 72 n.36, 139 (2011); Courtney R. Barksdale, Note,
All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV.
LITIG. 707, 735 (2007); Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1325–36; Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress:
Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 608–09 (2010); Max Radin,
Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 74–75 (1935) (arguing for the regulation of
contingency fees in a way similar to today’s arguments for regulating third-party funding);
Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 377–439 (2009) (propos-
ing defense-side funding in the United States that would be similar to after-the-event insurance
in Europe); Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act: A Regula-
tory Framework to Legitimize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 347,
350–61 (2004) (proposing a statute to regulate third-party funding for individual consumers).
20. See David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at
Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1076 n.3, 1077 n.6, 1077 n.7 (2013)
(reporting the results of their study on public data on third-party funding available in Australia).
21. See Raconteur Media, Raconteur on Legal Efficiency, THE TIMES (Supp. Mar. 25, 2010), at
7–9; Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1275–76, 1283–84; Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry, supra
note 19, at 67 n.93; Martin, Litigation Financing, supra note 19, at 685; James D. Dana, Jr. &
Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attor-
ney Compensation, 9 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 365–66 (1993); Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party
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many large companies that are constantly sued (such as insurance
companies or manufacturers of dangerous products) are seeking
means to smooth out the litigation line item on their balance sheets,
and funders can offer them a fixed-payment system for managing their
litigation costs as defendants.22 Fourth, the worldwide market turmoil
over the past decade since the 2008 global financial crisis has led many
investors to seek investments not dependent upon the financial mar-
kets, stock prices, or company valuations.23 Each litigation or litiga-
tion matter is its own separate entity and is independent from market
conditions in terms of the value of the underlying harm or liability.24
This independence shields the third-party funder’s investment and po-
tential profit from the general uncertainty present in the global finan-
cial markets.25
B. Defining “Access to Justice”
What is access to justice in civil litigation?26 Access to justice could
be defined in many ways depending on the context. For this Essay,
Investors Offer New Funding Source for Major Commercial Lawsuits, FULBROOK CAP. MGMT.,
LLC (Mar. 10, 2010), http://fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-investors-offer-new-funding-
source-for-major-commercial-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/39WX-8PQX].
22. See, e.g., Fulbrook Capital Management, LLC, Third-Party Litigation Funding, FINANCIER
WORLDWIDE (May 1, 2012), http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-fund-
ing/ (“Third-party funding offers corporate clients the opportunity to move the financial risk and
cost of litigation off their balance sheets.”); Kevin LaCroix, What’s Happening Now? Litigation
Funding, Apparently, THE D&O DIARY (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/04/Es
says/securities-litigation/whats-happening-now-litigation-funding-apparently/ (“Litigation fund-
ing proponents contend that the funding arrangements helps to level the playing field by al-
lowing litigants to pursue lawsuits against better financed opponents, or simply allowing litigants
to keep litigation costs off their balance sheet. It seems clear that as the litigation funding field
grows, the funding companies are offering new approaches – for example, the defense side op-
tion that the Gerchen Keller firm will be offering, or the ‘defense costs cover’ that provided
protection for prospective RBS claimants sufficient for them to be able to take on litigation in
the U.K. notwithstanding the ‘loser pays’ litigation model that prevails there.”); David Lat, Liti-
gation Finance: The Next Hot Trend?, ABOVETHELAW (Apr. 8, 2013), http://abovethelaw.com/
2013/04/litigation-finance-the-next-hot-trend/ (“Ashley Keller [of Gerchen Keller Capital]:
You’re certainly right that a lot of these clients have balance sheet capacity and could fund out of
pocket. Notwithstanding their balance sheet capacities, there might be institutional constraints.
If a company has a $5 billion claim, it will pursue it. But what if it has a $50 million or $100
million claim? If you’re a general counsel, a lot of C-suite executives are viewing your office as a
cost center. It’s not that easy to walk to the CFO’s office and ask for $5 million or $10 million to
finance offensive litigation. That will immediately hit the P&L of the company and affect earn-
ings per share, but the outcome is uncertain and contingent. We think a fair number of meritori-
ous claims are being left on the table notwithstanding balance sheet capacity.”).
23. See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1283–84.
24. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 11.
25. Id.
26. This Essay does not address third-party funding as a way to increase access to justice for
criminal defendants, because third-party funding is illegal in criminal cases in over sixty jurisdic-
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simple working definitions are appropriate. This Essay defines “jus-
tice” as the assumption that the system of civil dispute resolution,
viewed as a whole, reliably and regularly decides cases in a fair and
enforceable manner that upholds due process of the law for all parties
involved (leaving aside the idiosyncratic errors or biases of individual
judges or arbitrators). Of course, this is a naively rosy assumption that
could easily be challenged by those critical of the civil litigation sys-
tem. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thought experiment, such
an assumption is necessary—like a mathematical constant, if you
will—to examine access from a purely financial perspective.
Moreover, it is important to note that the definition of “justice”
used in this Essay does not address the merits of a particular claim or
defense. In other words, this Essay assumes that losers have just as
much right as winners to bring their claims or marshal their defenses
and, therefore, losers deserve as much procedural justice as winners
do—even though losers’ substantive arguments on the merits may be
less convincing to a judge or arbitrator. Again, such an assumption
could be challenged, but this Essay adopts this assumption as neces-
sary to the conclusions of this thought experiment, discussed further
below.
This Essay also assumes that “access” relates to the financial ability
to proceed forward in court proceedings. Thus, “access” in this con-
text does not address non-financial barriers to adequate representa-
tion, such as jurisdictional requirements, unfavorable precedents,
inadequate remedies, non-participating parties, the certifiability of a
class, or any similar non-financial barrier. In sum, for the sake of the
argument presented herein, this Essay limits the phrase “access to jus-
tice” to simply mean having or acquiring the financial resources
needed to bring your claim or muster your defense in court.
In applying this definition, there are an endless number of ways in
which a party could have or acquire financial resources for pursing a
tions worldwide in which this Author has conducted research. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra
note 1 (presenting research on third-party funding laws in over sixty jurisdictions). Nevertheless,
it is undisputed that severe access to justice problems exist for criminal defendants as well. See
e.g., Michele Goodwin, The Pregnancy Penalty, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 17 (2016); Michele Good-
win, Race As Proxy: An Introduction, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 931 (2004); Erik Bergmanis, Justice
Underfunded Is Justice Denied, 72 J. MO. B. 4 (2016); Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1201 (2005); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703
(2005). As a farfetched hypothetical, if third-party funding of criminal defense were allowed—
and, to be clear, it is expressly illegal in all jurisdictions globally— criminal defendants might be
able to subsidize the cost of their criminal defense using their related civil damages claims, with
the financier funding both the criminal and civil proceedings. This would likely be prohibitively
expensive and unprofitable, however, and therefore would not be an attractive target for invest-
ment by for-profit dispute financiers.
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claim or defending against it. For example, many parties self-finance
their claims or defenses. Parties may also acquire liability insurance or
political risk insurance,27 which may include paying the costs of litiga-
tion or arbitration. Subsidiaries may be able to tap into the resources
of their parent corporations. States or national governments may use
their internal legal teams or tap into their treasuries to pay external
law firms. A client may hire an attorney or law firm on a contingent or
conditional fee basis. And then there’s third-party funding.
Given the plethora of financing options, this Essay must draw an
arbitrary dividing line in the sand for the purpose of assessing access
to justice. On one side of that line, the party definitely has access to
justice; and, on the other side, the party could potentially lack access
to justice for the purpose of this thought experiment. It is important to
note that this is not simply a line between the “haves” and the “have
nots.” Instead, this is a line between those who most certainly have
access to justice and those whose access to justice is predicated on the
outcome of the decision-making process of a financier not present at
the time the dispute arises. Thus, for the purpose of this thought ex-
periment, the line will be defined as whether the party’s dispute fi-
nancing is based on a pre-existing financial relationship with the
financier prior to the event that led to the claim in the dispute. Of
course, this line could be defined by other characteristics of a party or
its case, but since this Essay focuses on financial access to justice, the
choice to draw the line according to the status of the source of a
party’s funding seems most appropriate.
To illustrate how this line functions, the simplest example is that a
party with the financial resources to self-finance litigation has a preex-
isting relationship with itself (the financier) before the claim arose;
thus, that party has access to justice, according to this Essay’s defini-
tion. Similarly, a subsidiary has a pre-existing relationship with a par-
ent corporation prior to the existence of the litigation. If the parent
corporation has the ability and willingness to provide financial support
for a viable claim or defense, then the subsidiary has access to justice.
Furthermore, if a party acquires liability insurance, political risk insur-
ance, or legal expenses insurance at the outset of a contract or prior to
entering into a commercial relationship, and if such insurance covers
the costs of dispute resolution, then the party has access to justice.
27. Political risk insurance insures an investor against a (usually foreign) government taking
an action that harms or devalues the investor’s investment. See e.g., OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVEST-
MENT CORPORATION, POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE, https://www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-
risk-insurance (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
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On the other side of the line, an attorney or law firm will not enter
into a contingent or conditional fee arrangement with a client until
after the event that gives rise to the claim has taken place. Thus, if the
party needs such contingent or conditional fee arrangement in order
to pursue litigation, then the party is in danger of not having access to
justice if it is unable to obtain such an arrangement. Similarly, third-
party funding—as traditionally envisioned—is tied to the existence of
events that give rise to a claim.
It is important to note that, since the definition of access to justice
articulated above involves engaging the machinery of court proce-
dures, this Essay assumes that types of outside funding not tied to the
existence of a dispute are more in the realm of corporate finance
transactions and are not contemplated within this Essay’s definition of
access to justice. The assumption here is that if a party has the where-
withal to enter into a corporate finance transaction independent of
any pending disputes, then it also likely has access to adequate re-
sources to pursue a claim or defend itself in litigation; therefore, ac-
cording to this Essay’s narrow definition, it has access to justice.
Furthermore, any insurance agreement entered into after the event
that gives rise to the claim has taken place, which is often termed “af-
ter-the-event insurance,”28 is categorized on the same side of the line
as third-party funding and contingent or conditional fee arrangements.
This line in the sand is crucial because the “access” in “access to
justice” is an indicator of possibility, not certainty. In other words,
having access to justice means that a party could financially pursue
litigation even if it chooses not to do so or is unable to do so for other
non-financial reasons. For example, if a subsidiary could bring a viable
claim with the help of the parent corporation, but chooses not to do so
for business reasons, then the subsidiary has access to justice, accord-
ing to the definition in this Essay. In addition, if the subsidiary could
bring the claim with the help of the parent corporation, but the parent
corporation believes that the claim is not viable enough to bring, then
the subsidiary has access to justice, according to the definition in this
Essay. Furthermore, if a party is the defendant with sufficient finan-
cial resources to self-finance and nevertheless refuses to participate in
the litigation (thinking that the claim is bogus, for example), then the
party has access to justice, according to the definition in this Essay.
28. After-the-event insurance often overlaps with third-party funding and is also offered by
third-party funders. See e.g., Allianz, What is after the event insurance (ATE)?, https://
www.allianzlegalprotection.co.uk/home/for-individuals/what-is-after-the-event-insurance.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
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On the other hand, if a party is the defendant and does not have
sufficient financial resources to self-finance while wanting to partici-
pate meaningfully in the litigation, then whether such a defendant has
access to justice depends on the type of financier that could finance
defendant’s defense. If the defendant can obtain a financier through a
preexisting financial relationship, such as a family member, a parent
corporation, or a pre-existing insurance agreement, then the defen-
dant has access to justice. If the defendant’s financial relationship with
the financier arises after the event that led to the claim in the litiga-
tion—such as a contingent or conditional fee arrangement with a law
firm, after-the-event insurance, or traditional third-party funding—
then the defendant may have no access to justice if it is unable to
create such a financial relationship.
This highlights a crucial point about access to justice, however it
may be defined. Any proper assessment of access to justice must ex-
amine the situation of parties that have no choice in the matter: de-
fendants. Defendants in all types of litigation have no choice
regarding whether the litigation will bind them to the judgment, re-
gardless of whether they are financially able to participate in the liti-
gation or not. Thus, defendants must have access to justice—obtaining
the financial resources needed to muster their defenses in litigation—
in order for the system to be considered “just” at all.
C. Cost as a Component of “Access to Justice”
There is also a cost component to access to justice, namely, whether
the financier’s willingness to pay the costs of litigation is predicated on
some relationship between the amount of the costs of litigation and
the value of the claim. Some types of financiers—such as self-finan-
ciers, parent corporations, and liability insurers—will pay the costs of
litigation regardless of the amount of the claim or the type of defense
because of their pre-existing relationship. Other types of financiers—
such as third-party funders or after-the-event insurers—might only
agree to pay the costs of litigation if the costs are some order of mag-
nitude less than the amount of the claim, or if the party provides the
financier with some other alternative form of remuneration. Attor-
neys on contingent or conditional fees likely fall somewhere in the
middle of those two extremes. An attorney on a contingency fee may
turn down a case that might be too expensive to pursue relative to the
amount the attorney could expect to be paid if the party wins the case,
especially since most jurisdictions have a legislative cap on attorney
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contingent or conditional fees.29 In light of this, the cost of litigation is
a crucial component to consider in determining whether a party has
adequate access to justice.
To further complicate the matter of costs, it is nearly impossible to
calculate in advance precisely how much a case will cost. The only
exception may be that certain types of financiers, such as third-party
funders or law firms working on a contingent or conditional fee, may
include provisions in their contracts capping the amount that they will
spend on litigation costs. In addition, there are different fee provisions
under the various arbitration rules—whether calculated on an hourly
or daily rate or based on the amount in dispute—and for ad hoc arbi-
tration30 the basis for the fees is even more variable. Moreover, there
are certain types of claims or remedies that may require more exten-
sive resources, such as class litigation, or that may require the services
of an emergency judge or arbitrator (besides the one deciding the
merits of the case), such as an injunction. The costs of such types of
proceedings may be highly variable and not at all connected to the
economic value of the result. Furthermore, some types of remedies
may have no damage award attached to them, such as injunctive or
declarative relief, in which case the costs will always mathematically
outweigh the dollars recoverable from the claim, even if the claim is
otherwise worthy and winnable. Finally, there is the question of timing
and settlement. If all other parameters are equal, a case that settles
early usually results in cheaper costs than a case that goes all the way
to an award, which in turn results in cheaper costs than a case that
leads to enforcement or appeal proceedings after the judgment or
award.
In sum, a case may be wildly expensive or may settle cheaply. Usu-
ally, one cannot predict in advance exactly which of these scenarios
will happen in a particular case. Considering the high variability in
cost structures and amounts, the thought experiment in this Essay
makes a simple assumption about costs. It assumes that the costs for a
hypothetical party to a case are reasonable and proportional for the
29. See generally NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1 (citing contingent or conditional fee
caps in Canada, China, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom and United States).
There are also likely many other countries that cap contingent or conditional fees, but which
were not included in the aforementioned book due to the lack of information available from
those countries regarding the availability of third-party funding.
30. Ad hoc arbitration is arbitration administered solely by the arbitrator or arbitrators and is
not overseen by the auspices of an arbitration institution or other administrative body. See e.g.,
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ar
bitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (exemplifying
arbitral rules commonly used for ad hoc international arbitration).
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type of case and type of claim or defense at issue, even though many
cases may be extraordinarily expensive or surprisingly inexpensive.
This assumption regarding costs is necessary for there to be any gener-
alizable conclusions to be drawn from this thought experiment regard-
ing access to justice.
D. Other Assumptions
There are a few less controversial assumptions in this thought ex-
periment as well. This Essay addresses only three types of parties: a
corporation, a state, or an individual. Multi-party actions—such as
class, mass, or representative actions—are not contemplated. Further-
more, this Essay categorizes the relief requested by a claimant as ei-
ther damages or non-financial relief, such as an injunction, specific
performance, or declarative relief. For defendants, the relief requested
(that is, the defendant’s “claim”) is characterized as “no liability”
(namely, asking the tribunal to decide that the defendant is not liable
for the injury the claimant alleges) in order to consider defendants
and claimants together in this study. There may be other hybrid, unu-
sual, or less common types of relief that parties may request, but the
aforementioned categories encompass the vast majority of types of
claims or defenses brought in litigation.
Finally, since it is virtually impossible to predict with certainty the
outcome of a case, this study addresses only two possibilities with re-
spect to outcome—likely winner or likely loser. However, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that, for some cases, a party may be just as likely
to win or lose. The reason that this study addresses only those two
possibilities is that we know that all parties, including those who are
self-financing, engage in some sort of analysis regarding the likelihood
of winning the case when deciding whether or how to proceed. Most
parties or their legal counsel have at least some expectation regarding
whether the party is more likely to win or more likely to lose the case,
and funders analyze this question and draw their conclusions often
before the litigation has even commenced. Moreover, some financiers
enter the case at some point in the middle of the proceedings or fi-
nance enforcement proceedings at the end of the case, and those fin-
anciers will have a different viewpoint regarding the likelihood of
winning than the financier who considers the case at the outset. Thus,
the categories “likely winner” and “likely loser” are rough and inexact
but help draw another necessary line in the sand, similar to this Es-
say’s aforementioned arbitrary dividing line in the sand for the pur-
pose of defining access to justice.31
31. See supra Part I.B.
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II. THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT AND OUTCOMES
This Essay now presents a thought experiment based on the afore-
mentioned assumptions in order to assess what types of litigation par-
ties are in danger of not having access to justice. This thought
experiment begins by excluding parties whose preexisting relation-
ships provide access to justice. From the foregoing assumptions, any
party that has a preexisting financial relationship with the financier
before the event that led to the claim in the litigation has access to
justice. This means that any party that has the guaranteed ability to
self-finance or to obtain funding from a parent corporation or preex-
isting insurance contract (liability insurance or before-the-event insur-
ance) has access to justice. This is true regardless of whether the party
is more likely to win or lose, regardless of the type of claim, and re-
gardless of whether the party is a claimant or defendant. This is also
true if the party chooses not to pursue the claim or defense, despite
having the financial resources to do so. In contrast, a party in danger
of lacking access to justice must enter into a new financial relationship
after the event that gives rise to the claim. This means that the thought
experiment will focus on avenues for financial support for litigation
that are available only after the event that gives rise to the claim has
happened. These avenues include contingent or conditional fee agree-
ments with attorneys, after-the-event insurance agreements, bank
loans, and traditional third-party funding arrangements.
The second phase of the thought experiment narrows the categories
of litigation parties that need dispute financing by separating those
likely to win from those likely to lose. Most avenues for dispute fi-
nancing that are available after the event are tied to the likelihood of
winning. Attorneys and law firms will generally only enter into a con-
tingent or conditional fee agreement if they believe the case is a likely
winner. Similarly, after-the-event insurers and third-party funders will
generally only enter into an arrangement in which they expect to
make money, which is usually tied to the party winning the case.
There are some structures for third-party funding or after-the-event
insurance (often, but not exclusively, on the defense side) in which the
financier receives some remuneration even if the party loses the
case.32 In most situations, however, financiers that enter into an agree-
ment with a party after the dispute has arisen want to fund likely win-
ners on the merits rather than likely losers, if such a characteristic can
32. These structures normally involve either the defendant making periodic fixed payments to
the funder while the funder pays for the fluctuating legal costs, or the defendant making a “suc-
cess payment” to the funder if the defendant wins the case and avoids liability, or both. See, e.g.,
Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, supra note 1.
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be gleaned at the outset. Thus, in contrast to the situation described in
the prior paragraph in which the party is virtually guaranteed access to
justice, a party with no preexisting financial relationship to the finan-
cier, and who is also likely to lose its claim or defense, has almost no
access to justice. The word “almost” is used because there may be rare
instances of financiers willing to back a case with a small chance of
winning (a “long shot”) but doing so on a regular basis would likely
not be lucrative for such financiers. Thus, parties likely to lose are
likely to remain largely unfunded unless a preexisting financier is
available. Therefore, such parties are likely to lack access to justice,
according to the framework presented in this thought experiment.
This lack of access to justice for these “likely losers” can be viewed
in two different ways. On the one hand, one could argue that claim-
ants who have a high likelihood of losing should not be able to bring
their claims, perhaps (for example) because those claims might be
frivolous. Similarly, one could argue that defendants who have a high
likelihood of losing should not need the wherewithal to muster a zeal-
ous defense, perhaps because they truly did injure the claimant and
the magnitude of that injury is equal to the relief that the claimant
alleges. On the other hand, one could argue that both claimants and
defendants may have a high likelihood of losing, not because the claim
or defense is invalid or frivolous, but rather due to a defect in the law
applied to the case, or the party’s lack of access to evidence to submit
to the tribunal (for example, if the opposing party is in possession of
the majority of the key evidence), or the party’s (perhaps less expen-
sive) legal counsel being inexperienced in litigation or arbitration. In
addition, even losers deserve the opportunity to zealously advocate
for reducing the magnitude of their losses by arguing in favor of a set-
off claim, a partial award, a lower cost award to the winner, or a lower
interest rate on the damages (if applicable).
Nevertheless, the lived experience of “winning” and “losing” feels
more like a spectrum than a bucket, because all parties involved lose
time in resolving the matter and most lose some money on costs. Thus,
this study focuses purely on winners or losers on the merits only,
rather than degrees of winning or losing measured by cost allocation
or award setoffs. The result is that likely losers on the merits that need
dispute financing typically do not obtain such financing and, therefore,
lack access to justice. This is our first access to justice problem that
this thought experiment has uncovered: “How can we provide access
to justice for ‘unfunded losers’”?
If we remove the foregoing parties with preexisting access to fund-
ing and remove the unfunded losers, we are left with what this Essay
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terms “unfunded winners,” namely claims or defenses that are likely
to win on the merits if the party is able to obtain dispute financing. In
civil litigation, the parties are all fungible, meaning that any party can
be on any side and bring any claim or counterclaim. In civil litigation,
corporations, individuals, and states can all serve as claimants or de-
fendants. In addition, defendants in civil litigation can bring counter-
claims or set-off claims, which gives them the ability to simultaneously
serve as claimants while also serving as defendants. Therefore, the
type of party is irrelevant in determining whether access to justice is
available to unfunded winners in civil litigation. This is also true in
domestic arbitration and international commercial arbitration, al-
though it is not true in international investment treaty arbitration, for
reasons beyond the scope of this brief intervention.33
33. Under traditional international investment treaty arbitration, corporations or individuals
are always claimants, and states are always defendants in investment arbitration. For arguments
in favor of granting states jurisdiction to bring claims in investment litigation, see, for example,
Victoria Shannon, The Structural Challenge of Investment Litigation Viewed through the Lens of
Third-Party Funding, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS: INV. CLAIMS (June 9, 2015), http://oxia.ouplaw.com/
page/491/the-structural-challenge-of-investment-litigation-viewed-through-the-lens-of-third
party-funding; Gustavo Laborde, The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Litigation, 1 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idp008. This is because tradi-
tional investment treaties do not provide for rights of the defendant state. For a basic explana-
tion of jurisdiction in investment treaty litigation, see, for example, Christoph H. Schreuer,
Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 MCGILL J. DISP. RESOL. 1
(2014), republished in, TDM J. 6 (2015), www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/arti-
cle.asp?-key=2293. However, some investment treaties negotiated in modern times do contain
rights of defendant states and corresponding obligations of the individual or corporate investor.
See, e.g., Tarcisio Gazzini, The 2016 Morocco–Nigeria BIT: An Important Contribution to the
Reform of Investment Treaties, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/
the-2016-morocco-nigeria-bit-an-important-contribution-to-the-reform-of-investment-treaties-
tarcisiogazzini/ (describing the innovations in this treaty, including putting obligations on inves-
tors to comply with the laws of the host state and providing a state the opportunity to sue an
investor in the courts of its home country for violations of the treaty obligations). While this
treaty does not allow for a state to bring an investment litigation claim against an investor, the
treaty does provide a judicial route through which the state may be compensated for any wrongs
the investor commits under the treaty. In addition, the treaty is silent regarding whether states
may bring counterclaims against investors in investment treaty litigation, which may open the
door to jurisdiction over such claims. The effects of these provisions will be tested if a case is
eventually commenced under the treaty. Furthermore, jurisdictional constraints restrict the types
of claims that can be brought. The treaty must specifically name the substantive rights that claim-
ants may vindicate in investment litigation. In vindicating those rights, the claimant may request
damages or non-financial relief, such as restitution in kind or specific performance, but only if
such remedies are allowed by the treaty. See, e.g., Michael E. Schneider, Non-Monetary Relief in
Litigation: Principles and Litigation Practice, in PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY: NON-MONETARY
RELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: ASA SPECIAL SERIES NO. 30 (Juris 2011); Brooks E.
Allen, The Use of Non-Pecuniary Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement: Lessons for Arbitral
Practitioners, in PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY: NON-MONETARY RELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL AR-
BITRATION: ASA SPECIAL SERIES NO. 30 (Juris 2011); Christoph Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Reme-
dies in ICSID Litigation, 20 ARB. INT’L 325, 325–32 (2004). Under more modern investment
treaties, defendant states may have the jurisdictional ability to bring substantive counterclaims
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Instead, one must examine the type of claim in order to assess ac-
cess to justice for “unfunded winners” in civil litigation. Damages
claims are understandably attractive to dispute financiers, because
there will be a pot of money to share if the party wins. Non-financial
claims and “no liability claims” (defenses) are less attractive, or may
be completely unattractive, because such claims do not automatically
create a pot of money to share, even though such claims may be wor-
thy on the merits. Dispute financiers that arrive on the scene after the
dispute has arisen are typically looking for a cash profit. This is where
the access to justice problem arises in civil litigation. The one excep-
tion is what one may call “not-for-profit” funders, which are funders
that take an interest in the specific merits outcome of the case for non-
financial reasons and do not expect to make a profit.34 However, “not-
for-profit” funders are not general market players in this space; they
typically fund cases on a one-off, case-by-case basis and cannot be
counted on to fund large categories of cases. Thus, “not-for-profit”
and the corresponding rights within the treaty that may be vindicated in investment litigation.
For some examples of how tribunals have responded in cases in which host states have tried to
bring counterclaims under traditional investment treaties, see Jean Kalicki, Can States Assert
Counterclaims Against Investors in BIT Proceedings?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 16, 2012), http:/
/arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/01/16/can-states-assert-counterclaims-against-inves-
tors-in-bit-proceedings/. Nevertheless, the right to bring a counterclaim is necessarily predicted
on the claimant bringing the original claim first. Thus, it is exceedingly rare to see a host state
bring an initial claim (rather than a counterclaim) against an investor under a treaty. As men-
tioned in the main text above, such a scenario would most certainly be possible in a contractually
agreed domestic arbitration or international commercial arbitration.
34. Cf. generally Victoria Shannon Sahani, Mick Smith & Christiane Deniger, Third-Party
Financing in Investment Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY AND EMERGING ISSUES ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES AND VALUATION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 49 (Christina
Beharry ed., 2018) (“In addition, not-for-profit funding may be a viable option for respondents
in international arbitration—particularly respondent States in investment arbitration—since a
financial return on investment would not normally be required.”); Sahani, Revealing Not-for-
Profit Third-Party Funders in Investment Arbitration, supra note 15; Third-Party Funders as
Stakeholders in International Arbitration, in CAMBRIDGE COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Andrea Bjorklund, Franco Ferrari & Stefan
Kro¨ll eds., Cambridge Univ. Press) (forthcoming 2020). For example, in Philip Morris v. Uru-
guay, Uruguay’s defense was funded by a not-for-profit funder called the Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids, and the Anti-Tobacco Litigation Fund (a Bloomberg Foundation and Gates Founda-
tion collaboration) is funding defendant states facing similar challenges. See Bloomberg Philan-
thropies, Bloomberg Philanthropies & The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Launch Anti-
Tobacco Trade Litigation Fund, PRESS & MEDIA (Mar. 18, 2015), www.bloomberg.org/press/
releases/bloomberg-philanthropies-bill-melinda-gates-foundation-launch-anti-tobacco-trade-liti
gation-fund/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). These are both not-for-profit funders, however, which
invites the question, should only not-for-profit funders fund defendant governments? This Essay
argues for answering this question in the negative, but cogent arguments could be made on the
other side. For example, in the political campaign finance arena, arguments have been raised
about the impropriety of corporate influence over elections and governmental functions through
lobbying and financial contributions; one could argue that for-profit third-party funders funding
governments, generally, could yield similar negative effects.
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funders cannot provide a solution that is generalizable to litigation as
a whole and, therefore, cannot solve the problem of access to justice
in civil litigation. This brings us to our second access to justice prob-
lem that this thought experiment has uncovered: How can we provide
access to justice for “unfunded winners” with non-damages claims or
defenses?
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The thought experiment above has raised the following question:
How can we provide access to justice for two types of parties in civil
dispute resolution: unfunded losers and unfunded winners with non-
damages claims or defenses? This Essay concludes with a few ideas
regarding how to address this question and thereby improve access to
justice in civil dispute resolution.
The first step is for our society to decide whether the concept of
procedural due process requires that unfunded losers and unfunded
winners have adequate access to dispute financing. This is more of a
philosophical question and, thus, is largely beyond the scope of this
brief Essay. The short answer, from this Author’s point of view, is that
the right to adequate resources for loss mitigation—i.e., a party’s right
to argue for a judge or arbitrator to reduce the amount of the party’s
loss—is a right that society should recognize as part of the concept of
procedural due process. Arguing in favor of loss mitigation may take
the form of pursuing a claim that is likely to lose, requesting an injunc-
tion or other non-monetary relief, arguing for paying less costs despite
losing on the merits, or presenting a viable defense including mitigat-
ing factors. Note that likely losers as mentioned in this paragraph may
include plaintiffs as well as defendants—a long shot could be on either
side of a case. Yet, long shots can change the world, as we have seen in
cases in which the right of minority groups facing long-shot odds and
unfavorable laws have led to judicial victories that have changed the
course of history. In addition, even in the criminal context, the loser
has the opportunity to mitigate his or her loss of liberty by taking a
plea agreement to reduce the length of his or her prison sentence.
Shouldn’t losers in the civil context have similar access to loss mitiga-
tion resources? Losers have the right to “lose well,” that is, to present
the strongest case they can for their side, even if those arguments do
not end up swaying the decisionmaker regarding the final decision on
the merits. This Author believes that the concept of loss mitigation is
as fundamental to assessing access to justice as the idea of meritorious
claims. Thus, for the sake of argument, this Essay will assume that
society would agree that the concept of procedural due process re-
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quires that unfunded parties in the three categories outlined in this
Essay have adequate access to dispute financing in order to proceed to
the next step in this analysis, although this Author recognizes that
compelling arguments could certainly be made on the opposing side.35
Assuming that unfunded losers and unfunded winners have a right to
adequate financing for their claims or defenses, the next step in this
analysis is figuring out how to pay for this. This Essay presents four
categories of possible solutions.
The first potential solution is for the unfunded party to bring more
than one claim in the litigation or arbitration. A party in civil litigation
has the ability to subsidize the cost of bringing a non-financial claim or
a lower damage claim via a higher damage claim, meaning that the
marginal cost of bringing two (or three) claims instead of one is signif-
icantly reduced. In fact, most plaintiffs bring at least one damages
claim even if they intend to raise non-financial claims as well. Thus,
the potential recovery on the damages claim could be enough to cover
the costs of the additional non-financial claims or low damages claims
such that a dispute financier might agree to finance the representa-
tion. A drawback of this solution is that it would be limited to un-
funded parties that have more than one viable claim, one of which is a
damage claim that would be attractive enough to a dispute financier.
This would therefore not include unfunded parties who may only have
a nonfinancial claim that the court would entertain, even if the nonfi-
nancial claim is strong on the merits.
The second category of potential solutions involves donations of
time or money. For example, perhaps third-party funders and after-
the-event insurers should engage in pro bono funding for a subset of
worthy claims or defenses that may be long-shot winners, which are
seemingly worthy but likely to lose, or non-damages claims. One
could include in this category worthy claims against judgment-proof
defendants, meaning that the plaintiff would likely win the case but
may be unlikely to be able to collect the award from the defendant.
The reason for this is that an unpaid judgment or award could perhaps
35. For example, in Essar Oilfields Serv. v. Norscot Rig Mgmt., the High Court upheld an ICC
tribunal’s ruling requiring the defendant to pay the claimant’s cost of third-party funding in
addition to paying the underlying damage award, because the court found that the defendant so
damaged the claimant’s financial position as to require the claimant to seek third-party funding
in the first place. [2016] EWHC 2361 (Comm). For a description of the Essar case, see, for
example, Maximilian Szymanski, Recovery of Third Party Funding Ordered by ICC Tribunal and
Confirmed by the English High Court – An Under-Theorised Area of the Law, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Oct. 8, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/10/08/recovery-of-third-
party-funding-ordered-by-icc-tribunal-and-confirmed-by-the-english-high-court-an-under-theor
ised-area-of-the-law/.
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have symbolic, political, or public value that would make the en-
deavor worthwhile for non-monetary reasons. Plus, it could result in
positive reputational effects for the funder or insurer that supports the
plaintiff pro bono in the case. A drawback of this solution is that it
would require a paradigm shift in the for-profit dispute financing in-
dustry to embrace its role in promoting widespread access to justice
beyond its primary profit-making motive. Whether such a transition is
possible remains to be seen.
Another way to frame this solution is by analogizing dispute financ-
ing pro bono efforts to attorney pro bono obligations. The attorney
bar in many countries asks attorneys to donate a small percentage of
their annual hours (e.g., fifty hours per year on average in the United
States)36 to pro bono efforts or for attorneys to donate money to the
pro bono efforts of other attorneys in lieu of performing the work
directly. Similarly, law firms regularly take on some litigation cases
pro bono, without any expectation of reimbursement. By analogy,
third-party funders or after-the-event insurers should donate some
small percentage of their portfolio funds toward pro bono efforts
without an expectation of a return on investment. In addition, a de-
fense fund for needy defendants could be established, perhaps even
from the funds donated pro bono by third-party funders, law firms,
and after-the-event insurers.37 Finally, crowdfunding by multiple indi-
vidual donors—which already exists—may provide a potential solu-
tion in this context.38
The third category of potential solutions involves changes in the law
or litigation rules. For example, courts and arbitral institutions could
adjust their fee scales to give indigent parties a discount on the fees.
Alternatively, courts and arbitral institutions could adopt a rule that a
party against whom an injunction or declaratory relief is granted must
pay the litigation costs of the winning party. This latter solution would
36. See A.B.A., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1 (“Every lawyer has a professional
responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render
at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year . . . . In addition, a lawyer should
voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of
limited means.”).
37. For a proposal for funding developing states in WTO dispute settlement, see, for example,
Mauritius Nagelmueller, Guest Post: Dispute Finance For Sovereigns In WTO Disputes - Access
To Justice For Developing Countries, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 12, 2017), http://
worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/09/dispute-finance-for-sovereigns-in-wto-disputesac
cess-to-justice-for-developing-countries.html (proposing that for-profit dispute financiers should
provide financing to developing states in WTO dispute settlement proceedings).
38. See, e.g., Manuel A. Gomez, Crowdfunded Justice: On the Potential Benefits and Chal-
lenges of Crowdfunding as a Litigation Financing Tool, 49 U.S.F.L. REV. 307 (2015); Ronen
Perry, Crowdfunding Civil Justice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1357 (2018).
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allow law firms to take on injunction or declaratory relief cases on a
contingent or conditional basis on the theory that their fees will be
repaid if the party is granted the requested relief. This solution has the
drawback, however, that it would only help parties likely to have their
injunctions or declaratory relief granted, i.e., unfunded winners; this
solution would not assist unfunded losers.
Finally, a fourth category of solutions involves financiers modifying
their criteria when deciding which cases to fund. For example, a third-
party funder might modify its algorithms and decision-making
processes to include other factors to weigh in determining whether to
fund a case in order to increase access to justice in litigation. One of
those factors could be ensuring that defendants have access to third-
party funding. Notably, defendants can fall into all categories of un-
funded parties mentioned in the introduction to this Essay. If third-
party funders financed defendants more regularly, then perhaps the
participation of third-party funders in litigation would be viewed as
more balanced, perhaps even viewed positively. This Author would
even go so far as to assert that, if third-party funders in litigation
choose to fund only one category from the three categories of parties
mentioned above in order to increase access to justice, then civil de-
fendants are a prime category with which to begin.
CONCLUSION
The thought experiment presented in this Essay intends to provoke
discussion and deep thought about the legitimacy crisis in our system
of dispute resolution as viewed through the lens of financial access to
justice and in light of new options for parties to access capital for their
cases. The assumptions made herein may seem rudimentary, and the
solutions presented may seem idealistic, but this is merely a starting
point for a global discussion wherein targeted solutions could be de-
veloped that may be more viable to implement than the solutions pro-
posed herein.
